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STRUCTURAL PRECARITY AND POTENTIAL
IN CONDOMINIUM GOVERNANCE DESIGN
Andrea J. Boyack*
INTRODUCTION
In the early hours of June 24, 2021, half of Champlain
Towers South Condominium, a thirteen-story multifamily
building located in the Miami suburb of Surfside, collapsed
without warning.1 The Miami Herald called the collapse
“unprecedented” in that one wing “simply caved in––for no
obvious reason.”2 The collapse killed ninety-eight people and
was the deadliest multifamily building engineering failure in US
history.3 After an arduous search and rescue and safely
dismantling the rest of the structure, inquiries sought to determine
why this deadly collapse happened.4 Who was to blame, and what
could have been done differently?
* Norman R. Pozez Chair of Business and Transactional Law and Professor of Law,
Washburn University School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Carl Circo and the staff of
the Arkansas Law Review for organizing a superb symposium and providing helpful edits.
1. See, e.g., Matthew Shaer, The Towers and the Ticking Clock, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28,
2022), [https://perma.cc/X2PP-354L].
2. Sarah Blaskey et al., House of Cards: How Decades of Problems Converged the
Night Champlain Towers Fell, MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 30, 2021), [https://perma.cc/QB5E65TF] [hereinafter Miami Herald Special Report] (“The tower wasn’t particularly old or
under major construction. There was no earthquake, gas explosion or terrorist attack to
blame. After standing for nearly four decades, one wing of the building simply caved in.”).
3. What to Know About the Building Collapse in Surfside Fla., N.Y. TIMES (June 24,
2021), [https://perma.cc/BMS3-BB9H]. See also Anjali Singhvi et al., The Surfside Condo
Was Flawed and Failing. Here’s a Look Inside, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/A8GX-FJ3U]; Arian Campo-Flores & Scott Calvert, Surfside, Fla., Condo
Collapse: From Glimmering Beaches to Ruin, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 29, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/FX95-E946].
4. Both the Miami-Dade Country’s State Attorney’s Office and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration of Surfside investigated the collapse. KATHERINE
FERNANDEZ RUNDLE ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE MIAMI-DADE COUNTY GRAND JURY,
11TH JUD. CIR. OF FLA., at 1 (Spring Term A.D. 2021) [hereinafter GRAND JURY FINAL
REPORT] (examining the “policies, procedures, protocols, systems and practices” to ensure
the safety of buildings and offering specific recommendations). The Miami-Dade police
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Within six months of this tragedy, engineering analyses
pieced together a picture of a building with hidden, fatal
vulnerabilities.5
Engineering experts concluded that the
condominium’s building design was flawed from the start.6 The
project was built by inexperienced developers using an architect
who had his license suspended for “gross incompetence.”7
Dangers created by design vulnerabilities were compounded by
shoddy construction in terms of materials and methods.8
Drainage and waterproofing were completely inadequate.9 A
started a homicide investigation related to the collapse, and the Town of Surfside hired a
forensic investigator to do a thorough analysis of the disaster. Phil Prazan, Surfside Hired
Him to Investigate Condo Collapse. Here’s How He’ll Do It, NBC MIAMI (July 2, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/3FG2-XLB4]. Champlain Towers South unit owners have filed multiple
class-action lawsuits against the condo association. The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) within the United States Department of Commerce also investigated the
cause of the collapse. NIST Establishes Expert Team to Investigate the Champlain Towers
South Collapse, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. (Aug. 25, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/NSM6-2Q5U].
5. See, e.g., Gina Harkins, What You Need to Know About the Florida Condo Collapse
as the Search for Survivors Continues and Probe Begins, WASH. POST (July 10, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/G6DU-R9LL]; Miami building collapse: What could have caused it?, BBC
NEWS (July 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/9PYU-RH3Y]; James Glanz et al., Condo Wreckage
Hints at First Signs of Possible Construction Flaw, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/KQ3T-XKKX].
6. Professor Dawn Lehman analyzed building plans and used computer models to
identify structural problems in the building, isolating the causes of the collapse and whether
the collapse was caused by inherent design and structural flaws or due to insufficient
maintenance. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
7. Engineers reviewing the plans for Champlain Towers South warned of “design
flaws” and “strength differences” between various structural components, as well as building
code violations. Id. “The wing of the tower that survived the collapse was held up by robust
24-by-24-inch columns. Building plans show the rest of the columns in the structure were
less than half that size. Columns in the pool deck were the smallest. And even the slightly
bigger columns under the part of the tower that collapsed were too small to safely
accommodate all of the necessary steel reinforcement, violating building code requirements
at the time.” Id.
8. Sara Blaskey et al., Contractor for Fallen Surfside Condo Later Lost License Amid
Fraud, Negligence Claims, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 25, 2022), [https://perma.cc/V54RMB6R]; Shaer, supra note 1. Their project had many personnel problems: two of the
project’s general contractors resigned mid-build, and the structural engineer overseeing
construction had previously built a parking garage that had immediately collapsed. Miami
Herald Special Report, supra note 2. It also seems that the plans were not adequately carried
out in the Champlain Towers South project. For example, some of the support beams that
were planned for the garage were omitted or spaced farther apart during construction in order
to maximize parking space, and the columns were too narrow. Id.
9. The report by Morabito Consulting in 2018 warned that water had damaged the
concrete slab and the damage urgently needed to be repaired. See infra note 14.
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neighboring development may have weakened the
condominium’s perimeter wall.10 The engineering post mortem
analysis concluded: “This building was so overstressed for so
long it’s amazing it stood as long as it did.”11
The final straw that broke the back of Champlain Towers
South was the failure to make necessary structural repairs. For
decades, the condominium board had opted for superficial
measures that masked the underlying vulnerabilities or even
exacerbated them.12 Members of Champlain Towers South
Condominium learned the extent of their building’s underlying
and worsening structural problems in 2018 when the board
commissioned an engineering study to comply with Miami’s
multifamily recertification requirements.13 The engineering
study identified several critically necessary repairs and warned
that “[f]ailure to replace the waterproofing in the near future will
cause the extent of the concrete deterioration to expand
exponentially.”14
10. Shaer, supra note 1.
11. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
12. See id. For example, board-authorized repairs of the cracking pool deck, focused
on appearance rather than structural soundness, paving over damage rather than excavating
the vulnerable slab, and each new layer added to the stress on the structure, pressing down
on inadequate supports and putting lateral strain on the structural perimeter wall. Id. The
condominium’s waterproofing and drainage problems had been exacerbated by leaking
planters and invasive plants. The condominium Board ultimately removed eight palm trees
from the pool area after realizing that their roots had been penetrating and weakening both
concrete and drains for two decades. Id.; see also Konrad Putzier et al., Behind the Florida
Condo Collapse: Rampant Corner-Cutting, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2021, 1:36 PM),
[https://perma.cc/86R7-RQRT].
13. Although Florida state law does not require any reinspection of multifamily
buildings, Miami-Dade’s County Code requires that multifamily buildings be reinspected
every forty years and recertified as structurally sound. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY CODE § 811(f)(ii)(1) (2001), [https://perma.cc/X2SS-YN3C] (last visited April 17, 2022); see also
Building Safety Program, BROWARD.ORG, [https://perma.cc/KRT4-JU72] (last visited Apr.
17, 2022) (Broward County building safety program modeled after Miami-Dade County’s).
Champlain Towers South was turning forty in December 2021, and the governing board of
the condominium commissioned an engineering inspection in 2018 and was “in the process
of securing compliance” with the recertification requirement. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT,
supra note 4, at 2; see also MIAMI-DADE CNTY. DEP’T OF REGUL. & ECON. RES., NOTICE
OF REQUIRED RECERTIFICATION OF 40 YEAR OLD BUILDING(S), [https://perma.cc/FW6VG2Z5] (listing the recertification form required by the Miami-Dade County Code).
14. MORABITO CONSULTANTS, CHAMPLAIN TOWERS SOUTH CONDOMINIUM
STRUCTURAL FIELD SURVEY REPORT 1, 7 (Oct. 8, 2018), [https://perma.cc/QL4F-SEJG]
(hereinafter MORABITO REPORT). Engineers compiling the report examined 68 of the
condominium’s 136 units and the building’s roof, exterior facade, parking garage, pool deck,
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After the 2018 report, the board planned for remediation of
the issues raised, but many members of the condominium balked
when they learned that these repairs would cost over $9 million,
an estimate that later ballooned to $15 million.15 Minutes of
board meetings over the three years prior to the building’s
collapse show that repeated attempts to approve a special
assessment to pay for repairs were stymied by disagreements
about getting the work done and, particularly, paying for it.16 A
vocal contingent of owners resisted the repair effort, and members
of the Board resigned in protest.17 The necessary work was
delayed for months and years until, one night, damaged rebar
inside the concrete structure fractured, thereby destabilizing the
tower and causing it to collapse in on itself “like a folding card
table.”18
Champlain Towers South suffered from design faults that
created structural vulnerabilities as well as insufficient
maintenance that exacerbated them, but the building’s ownership
and governance design may have also contributed to the deadly
effects of its structural failings. Champlain Towers South was a
condominium, a legal ownership construction that theoretically
encourages and enables adequate building construction and
maintenance.19 In addition to asking engineering questions about
the building’s physical structure, an analysis of the tragedy also
requires asking legal questions regarding the condominium’s
governance design. Structuring the building’s ownership as a
and common areas to determine what “structural issues . . . require[d] repair and/or
remediation in the immediate and near future.” It found that “waterproofing is beyond it
[sic] useful life and therefore must . . . be completely removed and replaced.” Id.
15. Shaer, supra note 1; Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3.
16. Russell Lewis, Months Before Florida Condo Collapsed, Residents and the Board
Sparred Over Repairs, NPR (July 2, 2021, 5:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/56ST-BXSF]. An
association PowerPoint presentation to residents from November 2020 “alluded to the
contentious debates among owners” related to paying for necessary repairs: “Complaining
Or Shouting At Each Other Doesn’t Work! . . .” said one side. Id.; Casey Tolan et al., A
2020 Report Found Surfside Condo Lacked Funds for Necessary Repairs. One Expert Called
it a ‘Wake-up Call’, CNN, [https://perma.cc/Y6VW-FAJP] (last updated July 8, 2021, 8:52
PM).
17. Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3; Beth Reinhard et al., Majority of Florida
Condo Board Quit in 2019 as Squabbling Residents Dragged out Plans for Repairs, WASH.
POST (June 30, 2021, 4:57 PM), [https://perma.cc/CSM6-8K5U].
18. Miami Herald Special Report, supra note 2.
19. See infra Part I.A-C.
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condominium ultimately failed to ensure quality construction and
upkeep, and condominium governance may also have inhibited
remediation of the building’s structural vulnerabilities.
This Article examines a condominium’s legal structure in the
context of ensuring construction and upkeep quality in a
multifamily building and explores possible systemic
improvements. Part I considers three latent vulnerabilities
inherent in the condominium governance structure: (1) overprotection of developers; (2) unwillingness of members to ensure
optimal upkeep; and (3) association financial precarity. Part II
critiques some suggested legal responses to the Surfside disaster
and discusses the swift and dramatic impacts on condominium
governance caused by changed underwriting requirements of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Finally, this Article concludes by
calling for more effective stabilization of condominium
governance to remediate its inherent structural weaknesses.
I. PRECARITY OF CONDOMINIUM GOVERNANCE
DESIGN
A condominium is a creature of statute, a legal ownership
structure that enables individuals to hold title to a box of space in
fee simple absolute.20 In a condominium, each owner holds
individual title to their unit, and all owners share ownership of the
common elements as tenants in common.21 Common elements
include everything that cannot be divided up, including the roof,
walls, lobby, halls, elevators, parking, building structures and
systems, fixtures, and all community amenities.22 All unit owners
20. Every state has adopted a condominium-enabling statute. Several such statutes are
modeled on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (“UCIOA”) which was created
by combining the Uniform Condominium Act (“UCA”) proposed in 1982 and 1977,
respectively, by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Some
states have their own comprehensive statutory regime governing condominiums and other
common interest communities. See, e.g., Davis-Stirling Common Interest Development Act,
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4000 et seq. (West 2022).
21. WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION PRACTICE:
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW 105, 121 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing how Boards make and
collect assessments).
22. See Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowner Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.
1519, 1522-23 (1982) (discussing how community assessments allocate common costs
among all owners).
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are members of the condominium association, which exists to
provide the governance that is essential for joint ownership, but
the association does not own any property.23
The condominium ownership form makes homeownership
more accessible and more affordable, particularly in urban
areas.24 Condominium ownership and governance enables people
to enjoy group amenities that they could not individually afford.25
Generally, resources used and enjoyed in common are subject to
overuse and under-maintenance because of the tendency of
individuals to maximize their internalized gains and externalize
their costs (the so-called “Tragedy of the Commons”).26
Condominium governance is designed to solve the problems of
free-riding and overuse by empowering the association to make
and enforce rules regarding use and maintenance of common
areas. The association funds necessary upkeep by assessing all
owners whose pro rata payment obligations are backed by liens
on their units.27 Collective action problems disincentivize

23. THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1, 772 (2007) (discussing the need for some governance regime in the context of common
resource management).
24. Every state adopted a condominium-enabling statute between 1961 and 1967,
leading to a “tremendous condominium boom” in the decades that followed. HYATT, supra
note 21, at 11-12. According to the National Association of Realtors, condominiums are
“one of the most attainable and affordable options for first-time homeowners, minorities, and
older residents.” NAT’L ASS’S OF REALTORS, A Bipartisan Effort to Make Homeownership
More Affordable, (June 2018), [https://perma.cc/MLV4-6HUB]. See also Michael N. Neal
& Laurie Goodman, The Housing Market Needs More Condos. Why Are So Few Being
Built?, URBAN INST. (Jan. 31, 2022), [https://perma.cc/BHJ8-ZY8G] (presenting data
proving that “[c]ondos are more affordable than single-family homes” in every major city
except New York City and Philadelphia).
25. CLIFFORD TREESE ET AL., RESEARCH INST. FOR HOUS. AM., CHANGING
PERSPECTIVES ON COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING AND CREDIT
ANALYSIS 1, 6-7 (Nov. 2001) (discussing how common upkeep allows a community to take
advantage of the cost savings from economies of scale).
26. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
27. HYATT, supra note 21, at 105, 108, 121 (identifying the authority to assess and
collect payments as a defining feature of common interest communities and discussing tools
available to Boards to collect assessments). See also Andrea J. Boyack, Community
Collateral Damage: A Question of Priorities, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 53, 73 (2011) (“The
association provides sufficient governance to solve the tragedy of the commons by
controlling overuse and creating a mechanism for maintenance and shared costs, which in
turn permits communities to avoid the economic downside of public goods, meaning that a
neighborhood can enjoy better amenities at lower prices.”). Condominium associations
typically are authorized to make regular as well as special assessments, and unit owners’
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individuals from acting to remediate problems that cause
widespread harms, including by bringing a lawsuit against a
builder for faulty construction or by repairing building flaws, but
having an association simply facilitates joint action.28
Condominiums have been called “little democratic [subsocieties]” that give members an economic stake and a measure
of control with respect to the multifamily building in which they
live.29
Condominium governance design makes it possible for
residents of a multifamily building to also be its owners.30 When
occupants have an economic stake in the real property they
occupy, there is theoretically an incentive alignment that
optimizes building quality.31 In contrast, landlords owning
multifamily rental buildings may be tempted to skimp on upkeep
to increase their profits because they can externalize the qualityof-life costs of disrepair.32 Condominium governance should, in
theory, produce well-designed, well-constructed, and wellmaintained buildings. In reality, that is not always the case.
There are three aspects of condominium ownership design
that should help avoid tragic engineering failures like the one in
Surfside, but each of these aspects is undermined by hidden
obligation to pay assessments are both personal obligations and in rem covenants that run
with the land. HYATT, supra note 21, at 105-09; Boyack, supra note 27, at 74.
28. Condominium ownership and governance functions as a built-in class action
vehicle for consolidating and litigating common claims. See Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental
Principles for Class Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 70-74 (2003) (discussing how
joint action overcomes collective action problems inhibiting litigation of joint claims).
29. Hidden Harbour Ests., Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
30. Under the common law, real property is owned in a column of space defined with
respect to a two-dimensional real property mapping description that indicates a closed figure
on the face of the earth. Today, every state has passed statutes that enable a threedimensionally defined ownership of space through creation of a condominium. Boyack,
supra note 27, at 74.
31. See Larry L. Dildine & Fred A. Massey, Dynamic Model of Private Incentives to
Housing Maintenance, 40 S. ECON. J. 631, 638 (1974); Marjorie Flavin & Takashi
Yamashita, Owner-Occupied Housing and the Composition of the Household Portfolio, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 345, 345 (2002); Geoff Rose & Richard Harris, The Three Tenures: A Case
of Property Maintenance, URBAN STUD., (July 2021), [https://perma.cc/4FTG-TVEN].
32. Adam Travis, The Organization of Neglect: Limited Liability Companies and
Housing Disinvestment, 84 AM. SOCIO. REV. 142, 145 (2019) (noting studies showing that
under certain market conditions, “the under-maintenance of rental properties represents a
rational, profit-maximizing approach for landlords”).

3 BOYACK.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

298

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

6/6/22 7:00 PM

Vol. 75:2

weaknesses. First, a condominium creates a vehicle for joint legal
action, facilitating lawsuits for faulty construction, and this
should ensure builder accountability. Second, association
governance solves the Tragedy of the Commons, and this should
encourage the care and upkeep of a multifamily building. Finally,
the ability to collect assessments from all owners expedites costspreading, and this should reduce barriers to funding common
costs.
A. Developer Accountability and Developer Control
Negligent construction of a multifamily building imposes
harm on all owners. A condominium association with authority
to bring legal claims based on construction defects solves the
associated collective action problem and makes it easier and less
expensive for owners to seek legal redress.33 Associations
frequently bring construction lawsuits against developers,
architects, and contractors more frequently than other owners.34
A large number of construction claims could indicate that
condominiums are more motivated and empowered to seek
redress for defects, or it could indicate that condominiums are

33. A typical provision is the Texas Condominium Act which provides that the
association has the power to “institute, defend, intervene in, settle, or compromise litigation
or administrative proceedings in its own name on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners
on matters affecting the condominium.” John W. Raley & Katie McClelland, Dealing with
Multiple Owners—Condominium Construction Defect Litigation, COOPER & SCULLY P.C.
1, 3 (Jan. 26, 2007), [https://perma.cc/N969-MHYZ]. Although in the early years of
condominium development, the question of standing was sometimes contested in court,
decisions have established that the association has broad authority to stand in the place of
unit owners and bring a claim on their behalf. Id. at 3-4. Many state statutory regimes
specifically preclude individual action against a developer for negligent construction in a
condominium. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183(a) §10(b) (2017). In such states, courts
have held that it would frustrate the statutory regime to permit individual lawsuits against
the developer for faulty construction. See, e.g., Cigal v. Leader Dev. Corp., 557 N.E.2d
1119, 1122-23 (Mass. 1990).
34. According to the American Insurance Association, owners in condominium
developments are four times as likely to engage in construction litigation than owners of
single-family homes. Raley & McClelland, supra note 33, at 1. For a discussion of the legal
issues involved in association claims against developers, see E. Richard Kennedy & Ellen
Hirsch de Haan, Litigation Involving the Developer, Homeowners’ Associations, and
Lenders, 39 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 2-21 (2004).
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more likely to engage in opportunistic scapegoating when
something goes wrong in their building.35
Condominium construction litigation typically involves
claims that the developer violated both express and implied
warranties of construction quality as well as claims that the
developer’s board violated fiduciary duties during the period of
developer control.36
Settlements range from developer
remediation to a payout of a couple million dollars.37 Some
construction claims result in much larger payouts. For example,
the developer of a luxury oceanfront condominium in Florida
recently paid $17.5 million to settle a construction lawsuit
brought by the association for flaws relating to pool joints, steam
rooms, and sliding glass doors.38 Construction claims pertaining
to the Millennium Tower in San Francisco resulted in a $100

35. Under most state statutes, construction claims can be brought by a condominium
association any time within ten years of construction, and the risk of a construction claim
being brought during that time by a condominium association is substantial and impacts
developer costs. A recent study in California considered whether laws facilitating
condominium construction claims reduce affordable housing in the state by raising the costs
of condominium development. See Cynthia Kroll et al., The Impact of Construction-Defect
Litigation on Condominium Development, 14 CAL. POL’Y. RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 2002),
[https://perma.cc/CZ2J-7YQC] (considering the merits of complaints by developers and
insurers that “frivolous” construction lawsuits led to higher development costs, slower pace
of condominium development, and higher housing costs in California relative to other states).
36. Many construction claims raise statutory violations as well. See generally, e.g., R.
Douglas Rees, Residential Construction Claims After the Advent of the Texas Residential
Construction Commission, COOPER & SCULLY, P.C. (Jan. 2006), [https://perma.cc/MG7FNB5P] (discussing how construction claims were impacted by three Texas statutes).
Construction claims seem to be particularly common types of litigation brought by
condominiums against developers. See, e.g., Condominiums, LONG & ROBINSON, L.L.C.,
[https://perma.cc/BAK2-SJ33] (last visited Apr. 16, 2022) (explaining that “[i]n
condominiums, defective construction of common elements—including problems such as
water intrusion, deficient roofing and defective windows—can lay a tremendous financial
burden at the feet of the homeowners’ association” and listing their representation in
connection with settlement of several multi-million dollar claims brought by condominium
associations against development companies).
37. A recently settled case provides a typical example. Complaint ¶¶ 16, 18, Westview
Highlands Condo. Ass’n v. Westview of Berlin, L.L.C., HHD-CV18-6110534-S (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018). Three years after initiating the lawsuit, the condominium and
developer settled their dispute for two million dollars, but only after 20 contractors were
impleaded in the case as third parties. Marianna Wharry, Condo Association Reaches $2M
Settlement Over Construction Defects, LAW.COM (Oct. 28, 2021), [https://perma.cc/CY55QQ7H].
38. Construction Defects Lawsuit Leads to $17.5 Million Settlement for Condo
Association, BURNS & WILCOX (May 26, 2021), [https://perma.cc/D3F3-TNMC].
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million developer remediation funded, in part, by the Transbay
Joint Powers Authority. 39
Statutes, procedural requirements, and governing documents
may limit a board’s ability to seek redress from developers for
faulty construction. For example, in New York, condominiums
are typically developed by a single-purpose entity that divests
itself of all assets by selling the condominium units. Until
November 2020, New York caselaw barred recovery by
condominium associations against the development entity’s
beneficial owners unless the unit owners can prove that a
fiduciary relationship existed between themselves and those
investors.40 This requirement effectively denied condominium
owners legal redress for faulty construction once all units were
sold.41
Statutes commonly require owners (including
condominium associations) to provide developers with the
substance of a complaint and a chance to remedy the problem
before a lawsuit can be filed.42 And, of course, statutes of
limitation and developer bankruptcy can prevent recovery for
negligent construction.
Several condominium statutes permit the developer to
modify default dispute resolution parameters by provisions in
condominium governing documents and/or purchase agreements
in order to limit who can bring what claims in what forum.43 For
39. Jay Barmann, Millennium Tower May Be Sinking Faster Due to Digging That’s
Part of Effort to Stop It Sinking, SFIST (Sept. 1, 2021), [https://perma.cc/K7RC-AULC].
40. Sutton Apartments Corp. v Bradhurst 100 Dev. L.L.C., 968 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485-86
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (holding that construction claims against investors holding the
beneficial ownership of a developer would be dismissed as a matter of law unless there was
a fiduciary relationship between the plaintiffs and the investors).
41. A New York court remedied this problem in Bd. of Managers of Be@William
Condo. v. 90 William St. Dev. Grp. LLC, 135 N.Y.S.3d 360, 362 (App. Div. 2020). The
2020 ruling also made it possible for associations with previously dismissed lawsuits to
recommence their actions against the beneficial owners of defunct developer entities. See
Bill Morris, Condo Owners Win Lawsuit Over Construction Defects, HABITAT: BRICKS &
BUCKS (Nov. 11, 2020), [https://perma.cc/A68D-3MTS].
42. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Notice and Opportunity to Repair Construction
Defects: An Imperfect Response to the Perfect Storm, 43 REAL PROP., TR & EST. L.J. 729,
748, 779-80 (2009) (discussing the proliferation and impact of NOR statutes and arguing
that a more complex, complete, and uniform approach to construction claims would be a
preferable approach).
43. See Ron Holmes, Stop the Lawsuits: Condominium Construction Defect Litigation,
THE HOLMES FIRM PC (Nov. 26, 2019), [https://perma.cc/9SNL-G7PL], for a discussion of
early neutral evaluation.
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example, purchase agreements can include a buyer’s waiver of
jury trial, or condominium documents can mandate mediation or
arbitration in lieu of construction litigation.44 One strategy that
developers sometimes employ is to require an “early neutral
evaluation” by an impartial expert who will analyze the alleged
defect and determine a proper remedy.45
In addition to limitations on the association’s legal ability to
seek redress for construction defects, initial developer control of
the association creates practical barriers to accountability. In a
condominium, the developer initially holds title to all units and
accordingly controls the association.46
Developer control
typically persists throughout the period of development, until a
supermajority of units is sold..47 During the Developer Control
Period, the developer dominates voting and controls the
association’s board, including its actions on behalf of owners as
well as management decisions regarding budget, maintenance,
and repair. The developer is constrained by fiduciary duties
because the board of the association acts in a fiduciary capacity
for all owners and must operate and manage the condominium in
good faith.48
In retrospect, the condominium ownership structure of
Champlain Tower South does not appear to have adequately
restrained the developer’s temptation to cut corners. This may be
in part because bringing a claim requires awareness of
construction defects, and many of the problems in Champlain
Tower South were latent for decades. When a condominium
association does not resolve building structural problems by
obtaining remediation from the developer, then the responsibility
of mitigating such problems falls to the owners themselves.
44. See Eva Lauer, Arbitration and Mediation in Condominium Law, LAUER LAW,
P.A., [https://perma.cc/ALS2-W48G] (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
45. See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 43; see also Mosaic Residential N. Condo. Ass’ n v.
5925 Almeda N. Tower, L.P., No. 01-16-00414-CV, 2018 WL 5070728, at *8 (Tex. App.
Oct. 18, 2018) (adopting this interpretation).
46. See WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 607, 622 (2d ed. 2008)
(discussing the developer’s initial control of a common interest community and when and
how control is transferred to unit owners).
47. Id.
48. See HYATT, supra note 21, at 128 (explaining the Business Judgment Rule in
judicial oversight of Board actions).
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B. Practical Barriers to Condominium Upkeep
Some landlords defer required maintenance in multifamily
rental buildings to boost their profits while letting tenants bear the
costs of living in unsafe homes.49 For example, landlord
maintenance cost-cutting has led to fatal fires, as recently as 2021
and 2022 in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York.50 Historically
and today, tenants frequently complain of uninhabitable
conditions in multifamily rental buildings, particularly those that
charge lower rents.51 Unless a landlord can make money by
increasing rents to offset maintenance costs, landlords have the
economic incentive to delay building repairs and updates.
One of the benefits of owning rather than renting a unit in a
multifamily building is that the unit owner can theoretically
ensure the quality of their home. Owners occupying the unit
directly enjoy the benefits of maintenance and upkeep.52
Maintenance economically benefits all owners (resident or not)
by preserving their equity investment.53 Theoretically, owner
49. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY,
64-79 (2016).
50. See, e.g., Madison Hopkins & Cecilia Reyes, 42 Fires, 61 Deaths: A Story of Failed
City Oversight, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N (Apr. 23, 2021, 6:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/6EPZVTJG]; Sophie Kasakove et al., 18 People, a Deadly Fire: For Some, Crowded Housing Is
Not a Choice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2022), [https://perma.cc/P4Q9-U92W]; Ashley Southall
et al., 19 Killed in New York City’s Deadliest Fire in Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2022),
[https://perma.cc/9DHG-MCU5].
51. The famous case of Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp. involved uninhabitable
conditions in a large multifamily project in Washington, DC. 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (1970).
The dangers created by poor landlord maintenance of rental housing contributed to the
creation of judicial and statutory implied warranties of habitability in every state. Paula A.
Franzese et al., The Implied Warranty of Habitability Lives: Making Real the Promise of
Landlord-Tenant Reform, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1, 3, 10, 11 (2016); see also David A.
Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 389,
389 (2011).
52. Compare Rose & Harris, supra note 31, at 2 (“It stands to reason that owneroccupiers would maintain their properties better than absentee landlords . . . .”), with Laurie
S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the American Dream, 32 J. OF
ECON. PERSPS. 31, 50 (2018) (“[R]enters are unlikely to maintain a property as well as its
owner would.”).
53. When buildings are more highly leveraged, so that less of an owner’s capital is
invested in the real estate, maintenance levels appear to decline. Lee Seltzer, The Effects of
Leverage on Investments in Maintenance: Evidence from Apartments, in FEDERAL RESERVE
BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORTS, NO. 1000 1, 1 (Dec. 2021). Owners, particularly
those in high-rise buildings, must fund consistent maintenance in order to preserve the value
of their investment. See Rachelle Alterman, The Maintenance of Residential Towers in
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occupants should be more willing to expend money to maintain
and repair the building in which they live in and represents
perhaps their largest capital asset. On the other hand, lack of
knowledge and buy-in from owners and board members can
obstruct efforts to undertake expensive repairs. Condominium
owners—including those elected to serve on the association’s
board—are rarely sophisticated real estate businesspeople and
may not appreciate the need for and impact of maintenance. Unit
owners accustomed to renting may incorrectly presume that
significant building repair costs are not theirs to pay.54 Even
though associations typically employ expert managers and repair
professionals to perform maintenance, it is up to the board and, in
some cases, the association membership at large, to approve such
expenditures.55 Condominium owner inexperience and lack of
understanding can inhibit necessary repairs.56
Condominium boards are legally required to maintain
common property, with costs allocated among the members.57 In
a condominium, decision-making is by committee. Although
democratic decision-making gives stakeholders a voice, it is
inefficient, complicated, and time-consuming.58 Board members
Condominium Tenure: A Comparative Analysis of Two Extremes - Israel and Florida, in
MULTI-OWNED HOUSING LAW, POWER AND PRACTICE 127, 128, 142 (Sarah Blandy et al.
eds., 2010). Landlords have a similar incentive to maintain to preserve their investment. See
Dean H. Gatzloff et al., Cross-Tenure Differences in Home Maintenance and Appreciation,
74 LAND ECONS. 328, 328, 341 (1998) (finding only weak evidence supporting the
hypothesis that owner-occupied homes appreciate at a faster rate than rented homes).
54. Ross Levin, Levin: People Underestimate the Cost of Owning a Home vs. Renting
One, STAR TRIBUNE (Sep. 11, 2021, 8:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/68MX-Q284]; Arian
Campo-Flores, Florida is Set to Pass Stricter Condo Rules After Surfside Collapse, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2022, 9:00 AM), [https://perma.cc/B4ML-5TSG].
55. HYATT, supra note 21, at 116 (“Often, special assessments require homeowner
approval and greater homeowner involvement than annual assessments.”); see also, e.g.,
Azar v. Old Willow Falls Condo. Ass’n, 593 N.E.2d 583 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (Illinois’
Condominium Act requires two-thirds of the unit owners to approve any special assessment).
56. See, e.g., CMTY. ASS’N RESEARCH FOUND., BREAKING POINT: EXAMINING AGING
INFRASTRUCTURE IN COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS 5 (2020), [https://perma.cc/97TT-Y6DK]
(“Survey respondents found that homeowners and residents were more receptive and
supportive of major infrastructure repairs when they were given the opportunity to learn—
in advance—about the scope and costs of the project from experts, like the engineers and
contractors who had specific knowledge of the damage and how to fix it.”).
57. HYATT, supra note 21, at 43.
58. Jeffrey L. Kerr & Vincent F. Caimano, The Limits of Organizational Democracy,
ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 81, 85, 93 (2004); Li Hao & Wing Suen, Viewpoint: Decision-Making
in Committees, 42 CAN. J. ECON. 359, 384 (2009).
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may be unwilling to upset friends and neighbors by mandating
disruptive or expensive repairs. In democratic governance, it is
difficult to accomplish a necessary, but unpopular, measure.
There is a great temptation for board members to kick the
proverbial can down the road rather than promptly attending to
the unpleasant business of significant remediation work on a
building.59 Even when board members do plan for necessary
repairs, they may face resistance from the membership.60 If
governing documents provide for association approval of any
large special assessments or capital improvements (as they often
do), a vocal contingent of unit owners can prevent the assessment
from happening.61
In Champlain Towers South, such
membership resistance proved fatal.62
C. Financial Entanglement and Precarity
Condominiums are authorized by statute and the governing
declaration to collect assessments from unit owners for required
common expenses.63 Assessments generally are based on budgets
proposed by the board and ratified by the members, which means
that significant increases in assessments require that a majority of
the unit owners agree.64 Some governing documents and state
statutes allow minor assessment increases without a majority
59. Procrastinating costly and unpopular repairs is a common condominium
governance program and was a key factor in the Surfside disaster. Mike Baker & Kimiko
de Freytas-Tamura, Infighting and Poor Planning Leave Condo Sites in Disrepair, N.Y.
TIMES (July 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/L5K3-XAC5].
60. Id. (giving several examples).
61. Id. HYATT, supra note 21, at 115-16.
62. Baker & Freytas-Tamura, supra note 59. Some owners refused to pay for structural
repairs, delaying the project. Id. Their resistance led several members of the Board to resign
in protest, further delaying remediation. Id.; see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying
text (where a similar situation occurred at another Florida condominium when a
disagreement in paying for repairs resulted in Board members resigning).
63. See UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107(a) (2008). The precise method
of allocating common costs in a given condominium is set forth in its declaration. UNIF.
COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107(b) (2008). Unit owners may split common
expenses evenly among all units or units may have a pro rata contribution share based on
square footage, number of bedrooms, or some other classification. UNIF. COMMON INT.
OWNERSHIP ACT § 2-107 cmt. 2 (2008).
64. See UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-123(a)-(b) (2008). Common
upkeep also allows a community to take advantage of cost savings from economies of scale.
TREESE ET AL., supra note 25, at 6.
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ratification, but large increases almost always require the issue be
put to a vote.65
An owner’s assessment obligation is a personal debt that is
secured by statutory lien on the owner’s unit.66 Because
assessments are secured by a lien, the association can seek
repayment of delinquent amounts both from the unit owner
through a collection lawsuit or from the unit’s value by
foreclosing on the lien.67 It is critically important that an
association be able to collect assessments from each unit owner,
even those who disagree with approved expenses.68 If some
owners do not pay their pro rata share, the association will lack
sufficient funds to maintain common elements and make
necessary repairs.69 In and after 2008, when a significant number
of owners in condominiums located in South Florida and other
foreclosure hotspots were unable to pay their assessments,
compliant owners either had to pay on behalf of their defaulting
neighbors or suffer the ill-effects of poor maintenance.70 In one
65. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 5605(b) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-4620(b)
(West 2010).
66. HYATT, supra note 21, at 107, 117, 119. Amounts owed and secured by the lien
may also include reasonable attorney’s fees, late fees, fines for violations of community
rules, and interest, although these additional amounts are sometimes capped by statute. See,
e.g., UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 (amended 2014) (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2008) (18% cap); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5650 (2014) (12% cap);
and GA. CODE ANN. § 44-3-109 (2008) (10% cap).
67. Associations frequently adopt a written collection policy stating protocols to follow
for collecting delinquent assessments. A few jurisdictions require a written policy. See, e.g.,
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33.3-209.5 (2014). Some associations operate without a formal
collection policy, in which case collection occurs as and how the board determines in its
discretion. Foreclosure is an option, but a foreclosed lien is often not the first priority lien,
meaning that the sale may not generate large proceeds, particularly if the property is
underwater with respect to a first mortgage. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 53, 90, 95. Most
states require judicial foreclosure of association liens, but some states that permit nonjudicial foreclosure of mortgage liens also permit non-judicial foreclosure of condominium
assessment liens. UNIF. COMMON INT. OWNERSHIP ACT § 3-116 cmt. 5 (amended 2014)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2008). An association that enforces its
requirements unevenly is vulnerable to litigation claiming violation of fiduciary duties and
good faith. See, e.g., Saunders v. Thorn Woode P’ship, L.P., 462 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ga. 1995);
White Egret Condo., Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 352 (Fla. 1979); Cowling v. Colligan,
312 S.W.2d 943, 945 (Tex. 1958).
68. Liens are critical to the functioning of condominiums and are the community’s
“lifeblood.” See HYATT, supra note 21, at 105, 118, 121.
69. See id. at 121.
70. The financial entanglement of owners in a condominium created issues in the
aftermath of the 2008 Foreclosure Crisis because owners defaulted both on assessments and
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case, a Florida condominium with affordable amenities was left
to sink into disrepair when several unit owners did not pay their
assessments. Soon, “the rats started chewing through the toilet
seats in vacant units and sewage started seeping from the
ceiling.”71 The decline in maintenance drove falling property
values still lower, and the desperate association began foreclosing
on people on a fixed income who could not pay the increased
assessment amounts.72
Unit owners bear the financial responsibility to maintain
their condominium, and this means that “the fiscal fortunes of the
members of a community are intertwined.”73 Although sharing
responsibility spreads the cost of maintenance, the condominium
ownership structure also means that an owner’s ability to
maintain their home is tied to other people who might refuse to
pay their fair share.74 When owners cannot or will not pay their
assessments, the association either must assess willing owners
even more to make up the shortfall or go without the repairs.75
their mortgages, and mortgage liens in most states enjoy complete (or at least partial) priority
over association assessment liens. See generally Boyack, supra note 27, at 77-79. See also
Monica Hatcher, Mediators Foresee Gloom, Doom in Condo Industry, MIAMI HERALD, Jan.
4, 2009, at 1H; Concerned Homeowners Association Members Coalition Forms, PR.COM
(Feb. 18, 2011), [https://perma.cc/FF7H-2C2P].
71. Neighbor vs. Neighbor as Homeowner Fights Get Ugly, GAINESVILLE SUN (July
10, 2011), [https://perma.cc/KNT5-KFVC] (discussing the problems of the Inlet House
condo complex in Fort Pierce, Florida).
72. Id. It is predictable that failure of a condominium to maintain will drive down unit
values. See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 581 S.E.2d 201, 206 (Va. 2003)
(Lacy, J., dissenting) (“[P]art of the value of a condominium unit comes from the ability of
the condominium to maintain the common areas of the development . . . . The ability to
maintain these elements is directly related to the association’s ability to secure payment of
assessments from the individual unit owners.”).
73. Boyack, supra note 27, at 76-77; see also Trevor G. Pinkerton, Escaping the Death
Spiral of Dues and Debt: Bankruptcy and Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 125, 129-30 (2009).
74. HYATT, supra note 21, at 121; Christine Haughney, Collateral Foreclosure
Damage, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2008), [https://perma.cc/U5RH-NVGW] (quoting Sam
Chandan, chief economist at the real estate research firm Reis).
75. The financial strain caused by assessment default during the Foreclosure Crisis was
particularly problematic because some of the deferred maintenance occurred in buildings
that had been constructed or converted during the housing preceding the Foreclosure Crisis.
The high demand for condominium units, particularly in South Florida, incentivized rushed
and sloppy condominium construction and conversion, particularly in projects where
developers could insulate themselves from liability through the condominium documents.
Instead of governance design ensuring high quality construction, governance design may
have created a moral hazard encouraging cutting corners. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 56-
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The Surfside collapse shows that unit owners refusing to pay
necessary assessments can have dire consequences. The
condominium’s 2018 engineering report warned of escalating
degradation of the structure if remediation was not undertaken,
and, in hindsight, this warning is rather damning.76 But the
owners’ resistance to a huge special assessment is also
understandable.77 A $15 million repair bill when divided among
136 unit-owners is still a significant sum: Champlain Towers
South unit owners were assessed between $80,000 and $336,000
for units priced only two or three times that amount.78 This
astronomical assessment was necessary because the association’s
reserve accounts had only 6.9% of the amount that was necessary
for the project.79 Simply mandating that unit owners pay such an
enormous sum does not make the money appear. When unit
owners cannot pay assessments, they will not pay them. This was
true in 2008 and is the stark reality that led to dire consequences
in Surfside, Florida in 2021.80
In response to the functional insolvency of some
condominium associations after 2008, approximately twenty
states passed laws requiring that condominiums maintain a certain
level of reserves or conduct reserve studies to ensure that the
association is not left empty handed should a significant capital
need arise.81 In the wake of the Champlain Towers collapse,
57, 59; Carolyn Gallaher, Are American’s Condos having a Midlife Crisis?, GREATER
GREATER WASH. (Aug. 10, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4PW3-DLW8].
76. See MORABITO REPORT, supra note 14, at 1, 7.
77. An analogy can be drawn to citizens resisting any tax increase in spite of critical
needs to repair and replace national infrastructure.
78. Putzier et al., supra note 12; Association Reserves, Older Condos Part 1 | Lessons
from Champlain Towers, YOUTUBE (Aug. 3, 2021), [https://perma.cc/ZE34-T2VU]
(describing Champlain Towers property values); Campo-Flores & Calvert, supra note 3.
79. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
80. See, e.g., Rachel Lee Coleman, Desperate Condo, Homeowner Associations
Thrown a Lifeline, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 7, 2010, at 1A; Haughney, supra note 74. The
owners in Champlain Towers South similarly lacked the ability to come up with their pro
rata contribution to repair costs. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
81. Nine states (California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah,
Virginia, and Washington) currently require that associations do reserve studies. Reserve
Requirements and Funding, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., [https://perma.cc/27D3-WZG3] (last
visited Apr. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Reserve Requirements and Funding]. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac also changed their underwriting requirements in the aftermath of the
Foreclosure Crisis to require that common interest communities allocate 10% of their annual
budgets to fund reserves; although until 2022, a reserve study showing low risk of a high
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Florida is considering imposing a hefty reserve requirement to
ensure that maintenance can still be funded even if owners cannot
pay a large lump sum assessment.82 The presence of adequate
reserves would mitigate the impact of a huge repair bill in a
condominium the same way a “rainy day fund” offsets the need
for an owner of a single-family home to pay to repair a broken hot
water heater or leaky roof. A mandate to fund reserves to a certain
level, however, suffers from the same problem as a mandate to
fund a special assessment: it presumes that people can and will
pay a higher cost for their housing. And unit owners may be
unwilling or unable to do so.
II. CONDOMINIUM STRUCTURE’S POTENTIAL
In the aftermath of the Surfside collapse, multiple lawsuits,
grand juries, and advisory task forces called for changes to laws
governing multifamily buildings and condominiums.83 Experts
examined how building code requirements, inspections, and
occupancy certifications can better ensure the safety and stability
of high-rise structures.84 A grand jury in Miami recommended
that government officials be granted greater oversight and

assessment could be offered in lieu of the mandatory 10% funding. See infra notes 111, 120
and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 87, 109 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, 8, 11, 16; REPORT OF
THE FLORIDA BAR REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW CONDOMINIUM LAW AND
POLICY LIFE SAFETY ADVISORY TASK FORCE, 2 (Oct. 12, 2021), [https://perma.cc/H7XYJLUS] [hereinafter FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT]; SURFSIDE WORKING GROUP,
FLORIDA BUILDING PROFESSIONALS RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (Sept. 2021),
[https://perma.cc/X5ZJ-MYZ5].
84. There is great urgency in addressing concerns regarding structural integrity of older
multifamily condominiums in Florida where approximately 3.5 million people live in 1.5
million condominium units, 60% of which are more than thirty years old. GRAND JURY
FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 2-3 (calling the Champlain Towers South collapse “a wakeup call for state and local governmental officials”). The Grand Jury Final Report suggested
ten or fifteen years, the bill introduced in the Florida legislature proposed a statewide thirtyyear recertification requirement that is reduced to twenty-five years for coastal structures.
Id. at 6; H.R. Pandemics & Pub. Emergencies Comm., Proposed Comm. B. 22-03 (Fla.
2022), [https://perma.cc/2HYY-D6L2]. Prior to the collapse, only Miami-Dade and
Broward Counties had recertification requirements. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra
note 4, at 2; see also MIAMI-DADE CNTY. CODE § 8-11(f), supra note 13; Broward County
Board of Rules & Appeals, 40 Year Building Safety Inspection Program, at 5.86 (2015),
[https://perma.cc/W9PH-WH7Q].
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enforcement authority regarding buildings’ structural issues.85
The grand jury also called for more frequent recertification of
buildings in Miami so that structures would be examined more
often than every forty years.86 A proposal that mirrored
recommendations of various task forces convened in the wake of
the Champlain Towers South collapse.87
Changes to
condominium governing law can complement such building code
improvements.88
A. Florida Condominium Law Proposals
Post-Surfside proposals regarding condominium law fall
generally within four categories.
First, condominium
maintenance standards should be established and linked to
mandated reinspection and reserve studies.89 Second, the quality
of improvements in a condominium and the sufficiency of
association reserves should be more transparent, specifically
disclosed to owners, buyers, and regulators. Third, various other
85. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 1. See also Vanessa Romo, A
Surfside Condo Collapse Grand Jury Calls for Immediate Reforms, NPR (Dec. 15, 2021),
[https://perma.cc/26LB-9LAS].
86. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 3,6; see also H.R. PCB PPE 22-03,
Pandemics and Public Emergencies Comm. (Fla. 2022), [https://perma.cc/6NAX-4BCB]
[hereinafter Florida House Bill].
87. Task forces advocated for additional and more frequent recertification
requirements for high-rise condominium buildings after transfer of control to unit owners.
FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 15 (calling for reinspection every five
years for buildings over 3 stories tall); SURFSIDE WORKING GROUP, supra note 83, at 2, 4.
88. Although the Florida Bar Task Force Report, Surfside Working Group, and Grand
Jury Final Report focused on necessary changes to state and local laws in Florida, the
Surfside disaster has already spurred changes and proposed changes to building and
condominium laws in other states. For example, the Los Angeles County Board of
Supervisors passed a measure mandating engineering reinspection for 30-year or older
buildings in Los Angeles County. L.A. CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, MOTION FOR
ASSESSING THE SAFETY OF HIGH-RISE BLDGS. IN L.A. CNTY. (2021),
[https://perma.cc/73LT-L68T]. Similar measures have been proposed in the District of
Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Ohio, and South Carolina.
89. Proposed legislation in Florida would require condominiums and cooperatives to
conduct reserve studies every 10 years for buildings that are three stories or more and
requires developers to complete reserve studies for every building that is three stories or
more, prior to turning over an association to the unit owners. Florida House Bill, supra note
86. The bill defines “reserve study” as study of the reserve funds required for future major
repairs and replacement of the common elements. Id. at 12. If passed, Florida’s law “would
be one of the strictest in the U.S. regarding condo inspection and reserve-funding
requirements.” Campo-Flores, supra note 54.
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proposals focus on educating board members, bolstering their
authority to make repairs in spite of unit owner objections, and/or
increasing board accountability to owners and government
regulators for repairs not made. Finally, several proposals focus
on establishing a non-waivable required amount for reserves that
a condominium must set aside for structural repairs.
Establishing maintenance and repair standards for high-rise
condominiums would provide needed clarity and cover for boards
with respect to building maintenance.90 Frequent, detailed
inspections would raise awareness of defects and needed
remediation, and it would be particularly helpful if these
requirements led to more robust accountability for developers
who negligently built inherently flawed buildings.91 Associations
require sufficient time and methods to discover and bring suit for
faulty construction, and laws should ensure that condominiums
can obtain funding to remediate harms wrongfully caused by
builders. For example, terms in condominium governing
documents and standard form purchase agreements that purport
to narrow the manner or timing of construction dispute resolution
and terms that insulate developers from liability should be
deemed ineffective.92
Transparency requirements would ensure that new and
existing unit owners are not caught off guard with respect to
forthcoming maintenance needs.93 If condominium buyers know
90. The Florida Condominium Act currently has “no express maintenance, repair or
replacement standards for boards of directors to follow in the Act or in most governing
documents.” FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 9.
91. The Florida Bar Task Force Report suggests the adoption of new inspection
protocols using developer turnover inspection report required by R.S. Ch. 718.301(4)(p) as
a model. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 14-15. That law lists
thirteen items that must be inspected, including roof, structure, fireproofing, elevator,
plumbing, and electrical systems. Id. at 13-14. The Florida Bar Task Force Report proposes
that waterproofing be added to the list. Id. at 10. The Grand Jury Final Report also
recommends more specific requirements for recertification and condominium maintenance
standards, particularly mentioning waterproofing. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note
4, recommendations 4-8, 10, 12, and 25. Lack of waterproofing was a significant source of
the structural problems at Champlain Towers South. Putzier et al., supra note 12.
92. See generally Andrea J. Boyack, Common Interest Community Covenants and the
Freedom of Contract Myth, 22 J. LAW & POL’Y 767 (2014) (explaining why common interest
community governing documents are not contracts that are freely chosen by unit owners).
93. The Florida Bar Task Force proposes that state condominium laws mandate that
developers provide a report with protocols for “required maintenance, useful life, and
replacement costs” of each item, and propose that large condominiums be required to include
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of upcoming maintenance needs, the condominium unit will be
more accurately valued in a sale. Disclosure mandates with
respect to current owners can help educate residents about the
need for structural remediation, and disclosure to governing
bodies can help ensure that dangerous structural issues are
addressed.94 However, disclosing existing problems to current
owners cannot avoid the effects of those owners’ prior mispricing
of units. Many current owners did not expect that their housing
costs would dramatically increase to fund significant structural
remediation in their building.95 Perhaps government programs
can find ways to help protect not only new buyers but also
existing owners who did not have the benefit of such disclosures
when they purchased their units.96
Condominium board members are non-expert volunteer
members of the community.97 As the Florida Bar Task Force
explained, “education of directors, officers and unit owners, as to
their specific obligations, statutory requirements and issues
involved in association and condominium management, operation
and maintenance is imperative.”98 In addition to education
efforts, some proposals call for enhanced board accountability for
maintenance failures,99 but increased accountability may chill
willingness to serve on the condominium board and may lead to
wasteful litigation among condominium members.100 It is
perhaps more effective to focus on enhancing the authority of
and frequently update such information on their website. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 83, at 13-14.
94. See, e.g., GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, recommendations 21 and 23.
95. Benny L. Kass, Wondering Why Your Condo Assessment Keeps Going Up? Here’s
How to Find Out, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 26, 2017), [https://perma.cc/6LEW-RBHS].
96. The Grand Jury Final Report recommends that condominium boards be required to
report to government entities. GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, recommendation
21. Such reporting requirements could be tied to oversight and enforcement or could be tied
to government assistance and guidance.
97. HYATT, supra note 21, at 81; Marilyn Lincoln, Condo Culture: Volunteer Board
Members Work Toward Everyone’s Good, NAT’L POST (Dec. 19, 2012),
[https://perma.cc/P4XA-DPXW].
98. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83.
99. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 33; GRAND JURY FINAL
REPORT, supra note 4, at 6-10.
100. Association and board legal fees are common expenses, and all members of a
condominium are therefore financially responsible for legal costs incurred by boards
defending against litigation from members. See, e.g., Ocean Trail Unit Owners Ass’n v.
Mead, 650 So. 2d 4, 6-7 (Fla. 1994).

3 BOYACK.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

312

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

6/6/22 7:00 PM

Vol. 75:2

board members to make necessary repairs even without unit
owner approval.101 A mandate to make repairs coupled with the
authority to do so may also provide cover for board members who
face unit owner resistance to assessment increases. Changing the
power of condominium boards, however, requires changing the
terms of condominium governing documents because
condominium bylaws are private contracts enforceable as such.
If a condominium’s governing documents mandate that unit
owners must vote to approve assessment increases, then changing
a statute to deny the owners that approval right creates a troubling
conflict with the terms of existing private contracts.102
Enhanced board accountability for structural problems may
increase board members’ focus on and willingness to address
adequate building maintenance. But lack of awareness and
motivation are not the only problems.103 Ensuring developer
responsibility for design and construction errors is also critical
because it is unfair to have unit owners pay for a developer’s
mistakes.104 In addition, simply mandating that condominiums
undertake significant building repairs will be ineffective if the
condominium’s financial resources are insufficient to do so.
The biggest reason that Champlain Towers South failed to
make critical repairs in its building was that it did not have the
money to do so.105 When a condominium has adequate reserves,
it need not resort to a huge special assessment to fund the entire
cost of necessary repairs. State laws vary with respect to
association reserve requirements, and in only a handful of states
is a particular level of reserve funding required by law.106
Furthermore, in some states, including Florida, a majority of unit
owners can waive the statutory reserve funding requirement, a
loophole that is particularly problematic when employed by a
developer-controlled association to defer maintenance funding.107
101. See FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83.
102. HYATT, supra note 21, at 109-111.
103. Supra Sections I.A-C.
104. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
105. See Baker & Freytas-Tamura, supra note 59.
106. Reserve Requirements and Funding, supra note 81 (describing the requirements
of various state laws).
107. Florida’s current law does not require a reserve study but requires a reserve
schedule for repair and replacement of major components, but this statutory requirement is

3 BOYACK.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

STRUCTURAL PRECARITY

6/6/22 7:00 PM

313

New proposals in Florida would raise the condominium reserve
requirement to 50% of replacing each component in the
inspection report “based on the estimated remaining useful life”
and make the requirement un-waivable by unit owners.108
If reserves are better funded, condominiums will be better
financially situated to make major structural improvements, but
reserve mandates risk being a type of magical thinking. Simply
requiring owners to pay higher assessments in order to fund
reserves will not guarantee that owners have the ability do so.109
Housing costs today are higher than ever before, and inflationary
increases outpace income growth, particularly for retirees on
fixed income (such as many residents of South Florida
condominiums).110 Growing reserves require assessments to
increase faster than inflation, which may make housing costs
unaffordable to existing and would-be condominium owners.
Alternate sources of capital might be required in some
condominiums in order to effectively fund necessary repairs.

waivable by a majority vote of the association. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 720.303(6),
718.112(2)(f), 719.106(1)(j) (West 2022); see also Florida House Bill, supra note 86, at 1314 (describing how developers exploit this loophole).
108. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 21; Florida House Bill,
supra note 86, at 14. The proposed Florida House Bill prohibits members of an association
from waiving the reserve requirement, prohibits developers from waiving collection of
reserve funds, and mandates that reserve funds earmarked for repair be used for those
purposes. Florida House Bill, supra note 86, at 14. Similarly, the Grand Jury Final Report
recommended that “the waiver provision regarding the obligation to fund reserves for
condominium repairs be stricken from the statute,” but states that if the waiver provision
remains, any such waiver should require the vote of at least 70% of the unit owners. GRAND
JURY FINAL REPORT, supra note 4, § 28-29, at 35. The Grand Jury also recommends that
the Florida Condominium Act be amended to prohibit repurposing reserve funds. Id. § 30,
at 35. The Bar Task Force proposed a less drastic change, requiring a supermajority (75%)
vote to waive required reserves. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 83, at 22.
109. One of the reasons that Champlain Towers South did not perform structural
repairs earlier is that the condominium could not obtain financing to commence the project.
Tolan et al., supra note 16. Condominiums do have the power to collect delinquent
assessments from defaulting unit owners, but collection efforts take time and money.
Foreclosing an association lien may be ineffective to obtain delinquent assessment funds
when a first mortgage lien encumbers the property. Boyack, supra note 27, at 75.
110. Nichole Friedman, U.S. Housing Affordability Worsens, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10,
2022), [https://perma.cc/6RUD-G5RT]; Lisa Iannucci, Making Special Assessments Work,
COOPERATOR NEWS (Mar. 2017), [https://perma.cc/2AUG-KBW6]; Nathan Crook et al.,
Florida Building Collapse Hints at Future When Only Rich Can Afford Beach, BLOOMBERG
(July 7, 2021), [https://perma.cc/4WQT-27RN].
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B. Impact of GSE Underwriting Requirements
As legislatures around the country debate changes to
building codes and condominium laws, in a practical sense,
condominium requirements regarding structural stability have
already dramatically changed. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
two government sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) that dominate
the secondary mortgage market, announced new underwriting
requirements starting in 2022 that require condominiums prove
structural soundness and maintenance adequacy as a prerequisite
to the GSEs acquiring loans secured by units in the building.111
Because the GSEs are the secondary home mortgage market’s
biggest players,112 their underwriting requirements define access
to mortgage capital.113 It is more expensive and more difficult to
obtain a loan secured by units in condominiums that do not
comply with GSE underwriting requirements.
The GSEs will only acquire mortgage loans secured by
condominium units in condominiums that conform to their
underwriting mandates.114
Numerous examples show the
111. Fannie Mae Lender Letter (LL-2021-14) [hereinafter Fannie Lender Letter];
Freddie Mac Bulletin 2021-38 [hereinafter Freddie Bulletin]. The guidelines are framed as
“temporary,” but contain no expiration date. Fannie Mae released two other documents
detailing these changes to its underwriting guidelines: Appraising and Underwriting Condo
and Co-op Projects, FANNIE MAE, [https://perma.cc/58G6-FLBY] (last visited Apr. 25,
2022); Jodi Horne, Protecting Condos as a Sustainable Housing Option, FANNIE MAE:
PERSPECTIVES BLOG (Oct. 13, 2021), [https://perma.cc/MQV7-DRNN].
112. The majority of mortgage loans made today are earmarked for resale to the GSEs.
Andrew Ackerman, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac to Back Home Loans of Nearly $1 Million as
Prices Soar, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 16, 2021), [https://perma.cc/7TFM-525B]; see also Ben
Eisen & Nicole Friedman, Surfside Tower Collapse Makes Buying Condos More
Complicated, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 20, 2022), [https://perma.cc/7NNB-QAMK] (noting that the
GSEs “wield enormous power in the housing market” through their dominant role in
purchasing and securitizing home mortgage loans); John S. Prisco, In the Wake of the
Surfside Tragedy Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Issue “Temporary” Requirements for
Condominiums and Cooperatives, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 21, 2022), [https://perma.cc/3TVTQUZJ] (opining that the “new additional requirements could make it harder for unit owners
to refinance or for new buyers to obtain mortgages”).
113. James L. Winokur, The Mixed Blessings of Promissory Servitudes: Toward
Optimizing Economic Utility, Individual Liberty, and Personal Identity, 1989 WIS. L. REV.
1, 58-59 (1989).
114. The Department of Housing and Urban Development maintains a list of approved
condominium projects, and the GSEs only purchase mortgages on units in condominiums on
that list unless there is “spot approval” of a unit in a building that otherwise meets all
underwriting mandates. See id.
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material impact that GSE underwriting requirements have had on
the content of condominium governing documents and
governance decision-making. For example, owner occupancy
requirements led communities to adopt leasing restrictions.115
Prohibition of third-party covenants led developers to stop
including private transfer fee provisions in condominium
documents.116 Further, underwriting valuation constructs based
on the racial composition of a neighborhood led to a proliferation
of community race-based restrictive covenants in the first half of
the 20th century.117
Per their new guidelines, neither GSE will acquire any loan
secured by a condominium that has “significant deferred
maintenance” or is subject to a government agency directive “to
make repairs due to unsafe conditions.”118 Units in any such
condominium are ineligible under the GSE guidelines “until
required repairs have been made.”119 The new guidelines also
suspended any flexibility pertaining to the GSE requirement that
associations make an annual contribution to reserves in the
amount of 10% of the condominium’s budget.120
The impact of the new GSE underwriting requirements is
twofold. First, condominiums now have further incentives to
ensure their building’s structural soundness and upkeep.121 The
115. Andrea J. Boyack, American Dream in Flux: The Endangered Right to Lease a
Home, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. J. 204, 255-59 (2014).
116. Id. at 258 n.302.
117. RICHARD R.W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 3-4, 91 (2013); RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERNMENT
SEGREGATED AMERICA 81-83 (1st ed. 2017).
118. Fannie Lender Letter, supra note 111; Freddie Bulletin, supra note 111.
119. Horne, supra note 111.
120. Fannie Lender Letter, supra note 111. Previously, under Fannie Mae’s Selling
Guide, lenders could submit a reserve showing indicating reserve adequacy in lieu of a 10%
annual budgetary contribution. Id. The inflexibility of the new guidelines may pose
problems for condominiums whose governing documents do not permit 10% of each annual
budget to be siphoned into reserves whether or not there is a need to plan for future capital
requirements.
121. The vast majority of surveyed condominium boards throughout the country worry
that these new underwriting guidelines will expose them to liability and impose onerous
requirements to attest to facts that they do not and cannot certainly know. Lew Sichelman
& Andrews McMeel, Surfside Tower Collapse Fallout Could Make Condo Financing a
Challenge. Here’s Why, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 22, 2022, 9:16 AM), [https://perma.cc/3ER75Y2M] (citing a study done by the Community Associations Institute (CAI)).
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new requirements will also make it exponentially more difficult
to sell units in condominiums with maintenance deficiencies
because of the lack of access to GSE-subsidized mortgage capital.
Lower capital availability also makes it harder to refinance a
condominium unit to raise capital for a special assessment.
Cutting off mortgage capital access to units in structurally
perilous buildings maroons the owners in the buildings, which is
ironic and dangerous in the context of structurally unsound
condominiums. Unit owners in such buildings who do not have
the cash to pay a large special assessment may be unable to obtain
financing to do so or even sell their units to someone who can pay
the costs. While it is prudential for lenders to ensure the structural
soundness of their collateral assets, from a public policy
perspective, punishing condominium unit owners for not being
able to fund needed repairs by taking away the ability of the unit
owners to get loans to fund those repairs creates troubling
outcomes.122
Spokespeople for the GSEs have framed the new
underwriting guidelines as a way for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac to “protect residents from unsafe buildings.”123 But because
the guidelines cut off capital flow to unsafe buildings rather than
facilitate construction funding for repairs, the true impact of the
guidelines is to protect investors, not owners. Of course, the
GSEs should have prudent underwriting guidelines, but the GSEs
exist not just for investors but also to achieve public purposes.124
Protecting GSE investors is a good idea, but there is also a huge
public need to enable the remediation of structurally unsound
buildings.
122. A similar conundrum was created by GSE limits on condominium assessment
delinquency in the aftermath of the 2008 Foreclosure Crisis, because unit owners in buildings
with 30% or more unit owners in assessment default could not access GSE-earmarked
mortgage loans. This left the unit owners without a source of capital to refinance (in order
to continue operating the condominium) and made it virtually impossible for the unit owners
to sell their units other than to a cash buyer. See Boyack, supra note 27, at 104-05. GSE
owner occupancy requirements and condominium leasing restrictions likewise constrained
unit owner flexibility and access to capital. Boyack, supra note 115, at 255.
123. Eisen & Friedman, supra note 112.
124. See Boyack, supra note 115, at 255-58 (describing the public policy mandates of
GSEs); see also History of Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac Conservatorship, FED. HOUSING
FIN. AGENCY, [https://perma.cc/T5HK-93KJ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2022) (detailing the
conservatorship the GSEs were put under after the Foreclosure Crisis).
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It would be preferable if GSEs made funds available for
condominium remediation and repair instead of simply cutting off
non-complying condominium owners from an important source
of capital. Perhaps the GSEs can innovate a way to protect
investors while also helping to shore up crumbling condominium
infrastructure. Maybe they could offer special funding to
condominium associations or individual unit owners to help them
pay for critical repairs, with loan amounts disbursed directly to
those performing remediation. The GSEs should examine the
impacts of their underwriting changes on unit owners as well as
investors and find a way to financially facilitate the structural
remediation that these condominiums desperately need—and
likely want—but cannot realistically afford.125
CONCLUSION
Condominium ownership structure needs to be shored up in
a way to help stabilize buildings’ structural flaws, but it is as
important to facilitate necessary repairs as to mandate them. For
condominiums like Champlain Towers South that are facing
hugely expensive but critically important remediation projects,
the owners’ spirit may be willing, but their finances are weak.126
Strengthening building quality mandates without providing
pathways to fund repairs will result in more noncompliant and
functionally insolvent condominiums, not more stable buildings.
In cases where buildings were poorly constructed, laws
should protect owners’ recourse to the developer. If those
responsible for inherent construction flaws cannot provide
remediation, public funding of remediation may be warranted.127
For condominiums with massive maintenance needs and
125. The Florida Bar Task Force agrees: Housing finance and affordable housing
administrative agencies should create programs to assist low-income owners pay for special
assessments needed for structural remediation of their buildings. FLORIDA BAR TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 83, at 10, 28-29.
126. Tolan et al., supra note 16.
127. For example, a public fund could cover developer liabilities that are not
recoverable due to expiration of a statute of limitations or developer bankruptcy. Some states
have established funds to cover construction defects from time to time, although many of
these are limited in scope to buildings under governmental control. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-3785 (West 2022) (creating a construction defects recovery fund).
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inadequate reserves, government or quasi-government entities
(for example, the GSEs) could provide the requisite capital.
Improvements to laws and policies should help facilitate
structural soundness, not just punish disrepair.
Condominium ownership design holds great promise.
Condominium ownership facilitates homeownership and selfgovernance and can help people build wealth while residing in
safe homes. But condominium ownership design is precarious as
well. Just as democracy is both a good and potentially frustrating
form of government, condominium governance can both benefit
from including stakeholders but also suffer from the inefficiencies
and insufficiencies inherent in decision-making by a committee
of non-experts.128 Unit owners object to assessment increases,
and their elected representatives are tempted to give them what
they want. As in all democracies, voters and leaders both prefer
to procrastinate painful and latent community problems. In
condominiums, the owners’ financial interconnectedness makes
individuals’ financial distress contagious, and unaddressed
structural vulnerabilities imperil everyone, not just those who do
not contribute to repair costs. Design improvements to
condominium law should be calibrated to address issues of owner
ability to fund repairs, not just their desire to do so. Ensuring
building life safety requires fixing the problem, not just assigning
blame. Thoughtful changes to condominium laws and public
policies can reduce not only the risk of building collapse but also
the problems inherent in condominium ownership as a legal
construct.

128. In his November 11, 1947, address to the House of Commons, Winston Churchill
called democracy “the worst form of Government, except for all those other forms that have
been tried from time to time . . . .” CHURCHILL BY HIMSELF: THE DEFINITIVE COLLECTION
OF QUOTATIONS 574 (Richard Langworthy, ed., 2008).

